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"The Question Is Which Is to Be MasterThat's All": Cunning/hamC, ibone Rita, and the Sixth
Amendment Muddle

Three things are clear from the Supreme Court's opinion
in Cunningham v. California,' in which the Court struck
down California's sentencing law as violative of the Sixth
Amendment, and from the briefs in the pending cases
involving post-Booker federal sentencing, Claibornev.
United States2 and Rita v. United States.3 First, the
Supreme Court has plunged Sixth Amendment sentencing law deep down the rabbit hole. Second, both the
government and petitioners in Claiborneand Rita have
adopted indefensible positions. Third, neither the parties
nor the amici curiae in Rita and Claibornehave offered the
Court any real help in crafting a sensible rule for the resolution of these and future similar cases. This essay
presents a critical analysis of the Cunningham opinion and
the Claiborne-Ritabriefs, followed by a few thoughts on
how the Court might start to make some sense of the current muddle.
Cunningham v. California
In Cunningham,the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the California state sentencing system in the
wake of its Sixth Amendment decisions in Blakely v. Washington4 and United States v. Booker.5 Under California law,
the statute defining an offense prescribed three precise
terms of imprisonment-a lower, middle, and upper
term. Penal Code Si7o(b) provided that "the court shall
order imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime."
The aggravating or mitigating circumstances were to be
determined by the judge. The State Judicial Council promulgated rules defining "circumstances in aggravation [or
mitigation]" as "facts that justify the imposition of the
upper [or lower] prison term." 6 The rules went on to provide a nonexhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and provided that the "judge is free to consider any 'additional criteria reasonably related to the
decision being made."'7 Upon finding aggravating or mitigating facts, the judge was permitted, but not required, to
impose either an upper or lower term sentence. The
Supreme Court found this system in violation of the Sixth
Amendment, as interpreted in Blakely and Booker, because
a precondition for a sentence above the middle term was a
post-conviction judicial finding of fact.

The problem with the opinion in Cunninghamis that
its stated rationale depends on a fundamental misconception of the relationship between the only three jobs the
judiciary performs in any American sentencing systemfact-finding, discretionary choice among legally available
sentences, and appellate review. Although sentencing systems vary widely in their details, only four basic
configurations in the relationship between fact-finding,
discretionary choice, and appellate review are possible.
Category I: The facts found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant generate a single, determinatesentence,from
which the trialjudge cannot vary, andfrom which there
is no appeal except as to defects in the conviction itself
Category 2: Thejuryfinds all thefacts (both those necessary to conviction and those related to sentencing) and
possesses discretionarypower to choose among the range
of sentences rendered legally possible by itsfindings of
fact. Such a system might, or might not, providefor
appellate review of the jury's discretionarysentencing
choice.s
No system in either Category i or 2 presents a Sixth
Amendment difficulty because the jury finds all the facts
upon which determination of a sentence depends.
Category 3: Thefactsfound by thejury or admitted by the
defendant generate a range ofsentencing options among
which the judge may choose in his or her discretion. The
sentence is unreviewable on appeal (except for reliance
on unconstitutionalfactors).
Any system in Category 3 likewise avoids Sixth Amendment problems, but to understand why requires more
careful analysis than might initially appear. The easy
explanation is that some systems in this category, such as
the federal sentencing regime as it existed immediately
before the adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
simply require no post-conviction judicial findings of fact
as part of the sentencing process. 9 However, the distinguishing feature of Category 3 systems is not that they do
not require judges to find facts but that they contain no
enforceable rules that constrain judicial discretion by correlating judicial findings of fact to required or preferred
outcomes. For example, even if the pre-Guidelines federal
sentencing regime had required that the sentencing judge
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provide a statement of reasons including findings of the
facts justifying the sentence chosen, the system would not
have offended Blakely's reading of the Sixth Amendment
in the absence of rules connecting judicially found facts to
outcomes and thereby placing some legal constraint on
judicial discretion.
Category 4: The factsfound by the jury or admitted by the
defendant generate a range or menu of sentencing
optionsfrom which thejudge chooses. There are rules,
guidelines, or standardscorrelatingfactsfound by the
judge with sentencingoutcomes. The sentence, and thus
the judge's choice among legally available sentencing
options, is subject to appellate review.
All the sentencing systems that have presented the
Supreme Court with Sixth Amendment questions fall
into Category 4. However, the Supreme Court's opinions
from Apprendi to Cunningham fail to provide a coherent
rule for which do and which do not violate the Sixth
Amendment because the Court, mesmerized by an obsession with fact-finding, articulates no theory about the
constitutionally required relationship between judicial
fact-finding, judicial sentencing discretion, and appellate
review.
The linchpin of the Apprendi-Blakely-Cunninghamline
is a supposed "bright-line rule" distinguishing sentencing
systems that violate the Sixth Amendment from those that
do not.' In Apprendi, the court said, "[A]ny fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."" In Blakely, the Court
declared, "[T]he 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely
on the basis of the facts reflected in thejury verdict or admitted
by the defendant....
"2In short, a judge may not impose a
sentence higher than that which would be legally possible
based purely on the jury's verdict or the defendant's
admissions, if, in order to do so, he must find any additional fact whatever (other than facts relating to prior
convictions 3 ). There are two glaring problems with this
supposed "bright-line rule."
First, if applied strictly, the "bright-line rule" amounts to
a declaration that where judicial sentencing discretion
exists, the exercise of that discretion cannot be subject to the
rule of law (or at least law may not govern discretion unless
the law takes bizarre and twisted forms). Although this may
seem an extreme characterization of the Court's holding, it
flows ineluctably from the nature of the legal process. Second, the "bright-line rule" cannot explain the result in
Booker and thus provides no guidance in determining the
permissible contours of the post-Booker federal system.
The Blakely/Cunningham "Bright-Line Rule" and the
Rule of Law at Sentencing
If conviction of Crime X generates a range of possible
penalties from which a judge may choose, then a judge
sentencing defendants convicted of Crime X can either
declare that all persons convicted of Crime X in his court-
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room will receive the same penalty or try to distinguish
among those who have committed Crime X. If he takes
the latter course and does so on any basis other than a lottery, he must identify-at least in his own mind-facts
that distinguish the case before him from the universe of
other cases involving convictions of Crime X. The facts
deemed important by the judge might be facts about the
offender (age, prior criminal record, prior good works,
family ties, etc.) or facts about the offense that make this
instance of Crime X more or less troublesome than other
instances (violence, quantity of drugs, amount of loss, role
in the offense, etc.), 4 But a judge making rational distinctions among those who have committed Crime X must
find facts, and the facts on which the distinctions are
based cannot be the elements of Crime X, because by definition all members of the defendant class committed
those elements.
Moreover, in every existing sentencing system in
which conviction presents the judge a choice of more and
less severe punishments for the same crime, a rational
sentencing judge must find the existence of aggravating
non-element factors in order to justify imposition of some
subset of the legally available sentences. If, as was the case
in California in Cunningham,the law provides for a lower,
middle, and upper term upon conviction, a rational judge
would be obliged to find some non-element fact to justify
imposition of the upper term even if the law did not affirmatively require it. Similarly, if the law provides a
presumptive, aggravated, and mitigated range upon conviction, as was true in the Washington guideline scheme
invalidated in Blakely,5 a rational judge is obliged to find
some non-element aggravating fact to rationally justify
imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range. Even in
a system that specified no middle term or presumptive
middle range but instead, upon conviction, presented the
sentencing judge with an undifferentiated range within
which to exercise sentencing discretion, a rational judge
would nonetheless have to identify some non-element
aggravating factor to justify a sentence at the upper end of
the range.
Thus far, law has not entered into the analysis. We are
merely defining the minimum requisites of rational decision making by a judge possessing sentencing discretion.
Law enters only when two additional conditions exist: (I)
rules that correlate non-element facts with some required or
preferred sentencing outcome, and (2) a mechanism for
enforcing those rules. Rules of this correlating sort can
emerge from a variety of sources, including statutes, administratively enacted guidelines, or common-law judicial rule
making. Likewise, they may take a wide variety of forms.
They may, for example, say that if the judge finds Fact A, he
must impose a particular sentence; or that if he finds Fact B,
he may, but need not, impose a higher (or lower) sentence
than would otherwise have been possible in the absence of
Fact B; or that if he finds Facts A, B, and C, he should, all
else being equal, sentence within a particular elevated (or
reduced) range; or that if he finds one or more facts of a
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general type (e.g., "aggravating" or "mitigating"), he may, or
should, or must impose a different sentence than he would
in the absence of such facts. What makes these correlations
law is the presence of an enforcement mechanism that can
overturn the sentencing judge's decision if he fails to adhere
to the rule correlating facts with outcomes. The only available enforcement mechanism is appellate review. Just as
traffic law is a body of rules governing the conduct of drivers, sentencing law is a body of rules governing the conduct
of sentencing judges. If a judge is absolutely at liberty to
impose sentences in contravention of sentencing rules without ever being reversed, those rules are no more law than
traffic regulations would be if no tickets could be issued or
fines collected.
Note that sentencing rules imposing quite different
kinds and degrees of constraint on judicial sentencing discretion may properly be considered law. Compare, for
example, a rule requiring the sentencing judge to impose
a sentence often years' imprisonment, no more and no
less, upon the finding of Fact X, with another rule that
declares that a judge may, but need not, impose a sentence
of more than ten years only if Fact X is found. The first
rule simultaneously empowers and requires the judge to
impose ten years upon a finding of Fact X, whereas the
second empowers him to do so without requiring it. Both
rules are forms of "law" so long as a court of appeals is
empowered to vacate a sentence violating the rule, either
because the judge did not find the required fact or
because, having found it, the judge imposed a sentence
different from that required by the rule. Similarly, a rule
correlating a set of judge-found facts to a range of permissible sentences is a law so long as an appellate court can
vacate a sentence imposed within the range for failure to
find the facts generating the range or a sentence imposed
outside the permissible range for failure to abide by the
rule requiring a sentence within it.
Likewise, in sentencing, as elsewhere, a rule creating a
presumption may be a form of law. Consider a rule stating that a judicial finding of Fact X creates a presumption
that a sentence of ten to twelve years is proper, but that
some other sentence may be imposed if there exist
extraordinary aggravating or mitigating circumstances
sufficient to overcome the presumption. Such a rule is a
rule of law so long as an appellate court can overturn a
sentence outside the range, either on the ground that the
sentencing judge found no aggravating or mitigating circumstance or on the ground that the circumstances
found were not sufficiently "extraordinary" to overcome
the presumption. Finally, and critically to the present discussion, even a rule that grants the sentencing judge an
array of choices upon conviction, subject only to the constraints that he explain his choice and that the choice be a
reasonable one, allows for the operation of law within the
array so long as an appellate court has the power to
reverse a sentence within the array of choices made possible by conviction on the ground that the judge's choice to
impose it was unreasonable.
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This last type of sentencing rule deserves particular
attention because it is, in its essence, the post-Booker federal system at issue in Claiborne and Rita. Booker found
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional
because they prohibited a judge from imposing a sentence
above the range created by the Guidelines' base offense
level unless the judge found some additional aggravating
fact that would either increase the sentencing range or
permit an upward departure. The Booker remedial opinion
sought to circumvent this difficulty by making the Guidelines advisory. However, declaring the Guidelines advisory
does not alter the fundamental requirements of rational
decision making. After Booker, a sentencing judge is still
presented with a statutorily created range of sentencing
choices. For example, a defendant convicted of the crime
of mail fraud is subject to a range of punishment from
probation to twenty years' imprisonment. 6 A sentence at
the upper end of such a range cannot be rationally justified unless the judge finds some fact in addition to the
elements of the crime.
In the case of federal sentencing, the logical imperatives of rational decision making are reinforced by specific
statutory commands. Section 3 553 (a)(4)(A), which was left
intact by Booker, requires that judges at least consider the
range produced by application of the Sentencing Guidelines and thus requires that judges find the facts necessary
to determination of that Guideline range. Moreover, i8
U.S.C. S3553(c), also still in force after Booker, requires
that the court provide a statement of the "specific reason
for the imposition of a sentence" outside the Guideline
range, a requirement that obliges the court to find even
more non-element facts to justify a sentence above the
Guideline range but within the statutory maximum. Additionally, although Booker has surely reduced the
importance of the Guidelines in the final sentencing calculus, all the non-Guidelines factors and purposes listed
in 18 U.S.C. 5 3553(a)(I) and (2) also require, expressly or
by necessary implication, findings of one or more facts not
necessary to conviction of the underlying crime. Finally,
the Sentencing Reform Act's so-called parsimony provision provides that the sentencing court "shall impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in [I8 U.S.C.
S3553(a)(2)]."' 7 A great many claims have been made for
this rule (some of them in my view unsustainable), but at
a minimum it creates a requirement that a sentence
greater than the minimum required by law be justified by
reference to some case-specific consideration, or in Blakely
terms, some non-element finding of fact.
In short, the judicially amended post-Booker remainder
of the SRA expressly mandates what rationality would in
any case require-fact-based justifications at least for sentences at the high end of the legally available range and, if
one gives a strong reading to the parsimony provision, for
any sentence above the legal minimum. In this respect the
present federal system is no different from the California
law voided in Cunningham.And on this point, Justice
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Ginsburg's rebuttal in Cunninghamof Justice Alito's suggestion that a sentencing consideration could be
something other than a fact has equal force as applied to
federal law. I8
But Justice Alito is right and Justice Ginsburg wrong
in Cunningham about a far more important point-the
role of appellate reasonableness review. What transforms
the provisions of the SRA requiring rational fact-based
explanations of sentencing choices from a set of suggestions into a law subject to constitutional regulation is
precisely the Booker Court's imposition of reasonableness
review. Without appellate authority to reject some sentences as unreasonable correlations between facts and
outcomes, the sentencing power of judges is unconstrained within the wide boundaries set by statutory
minimum and maximum penalties and, insofar as it is
unconstrained, is not subject to the rule of law. If the
Supreme Court had not included appellate reasonableness review as part of its remedy, the result would have
been a reversion to the pre-SRA regime of unfettered
judicial discretion, the sole difference being a ceremonial
obligation to consult guidelines that, once consulted,
could be entirely ignored. Booker's imposition of reasonableness review means that it is a violation of the law, for
which there is a cognizable remedy, for a judge to impose
an unreasonable sentence.
It cannot be seriously maintained that a court of
appeals applying the Sentencing Reform Act would find
"reasonable" a sentence in which the judge imposed a
term at or near the maximum sentence permitted by the
fact of conviction without providing a justification based
on a finding of one or more aggravating non-element facts
particular to the defendant or the case. Therefore, as Justice Alito correctly points out in Cunningham,'9even in the
post-Booker system of advisory guidelines, there exists a
set of federal sentences (those at the upper end of the
statutorily available range) that cannot legally be imposed
in the absence of a post-conviction judicial finding of
fact. 2 0 In short, the post-Booker Guidelines violate the
"bright-line rule" proclaimed in Blakely and embraced by
the Cunninghammajority.
The Blakely/Cunningham "Bright-Line Rule" in
Claiborne and Rita
That said, my purpose here is not to argue that the postBooker federal guidelines are unconstitutional under
Blakely. After all, the Booker remedial majority said that
they are not. Nor is my purpose to join Justice Alito in
contending that the California guidelines are constitutional under the Booker rule. My point is that the
"bright-line rule" so fervently endorsed in Cunningham
gives no clue as to why the post-Booker federal guidelines
are constitutionally acceptable while the California statute
is not. Nor does it answer the question of how much
weight guidelines can be accorded in a constitutionally
acceptable sentencing system. The answer, if there is one,
must lie not in the requirement of judicial fact-finding but
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in the manner and degree to which the facts found constrain the exercise of judicial discretion.
Stated in this way, the problem sounds relatively simple.
However, an examination of the positions adopted by the
parties in Rita and Claiborneillustrates the nearly impenetrable difficulties the Court has created for itself. In United
States v. Claiborne,the Eighth Circuit held that the sentencing range produced by application of Guidelines rules to
certain post-conviction judicial findings of fact enjoyed a
presumption of reasonableness and that a sentence substantially at variance from that range could be upheld only if
the trial judge identified extraordinary circumstances justifying the variance." In United States v. Rita, the Fourth
Circuit upheld a sentence imposed within the applicable
Guideline range in reliance on its general rule that "a sentence imposed 'within the properly calculated guideline
range ...is presumptively reasonable.1"22 The issue presented in both cases is the weight to be accorded by
sentencing judges to the Guidelines and their ranges.
The Government's Position
The problem for the government is that the construction
of federal sentencing law it is defending in Claiborneand
Rita-one in which judicially found facts create presumptively correct ranges higher than the minimum sentence
legally authorized by the fact of conviction-is constitutionally indistinguishable from the Guidelines regime
invalidated in Booker, at least on any ground so far articulated by the Supreme Court.
Compare Mr. Claiborne's posture under the pre-Booker
system with what the Eighth Circuit holds to be current
law in his case. First, both before and after Booker, Claiborne's conviction would subject him to a statutory
sentencing range of zero to twenty years,

21

U.S.C.

84 1(b)(i)(C). Both before and after Booker, the district
judge is obliged by law to make post-conviction findings of
Guidelines facts. This obligation arises from the requirement of I8 U.S.C. 3553(a)(4)(A) that the court "shall
consider.., the applicable category of offense committed
by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the
guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission..

. ."A

judge cannot "consider" the sentencing range prescribed
by the Guidelines unless she first finds the facts necessary
to calculate the range.
The district court found that Claiborne possessed a bit
more than five grams of crack cocaine. This finding had
two consequences. First, the amount was large enough to
trigger a five-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21
U.S.C. S 84 1(b)(i)(B), but the judge also found facts making the defendant eligible for the so-called safety valve of
i8 U.S.C. S 3553 (f), thus rendering the mandatory minimum sentence inapplicable. The mandatory minimum
sentence and the safety valve process would have been the
same before Booker. Second, the judicial findings of drug
quantity and safety valve eligibility generated a Guideline
range of thirty-seven to forty-six months-the same range
that would have applied pre-Booker.23 To this point, the
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pre- and post-Booker sentencing processes would have
been identical in every particular. Therefore, if Booker
effected any constitutionally significant change, it must
relate to what a judge is to do once the Guidelines sentencing range is calculated.
Before Booker, the judge was obliged to sentence within
the range "unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that prescribed,"
i8 U.S.C. 3553 (b). The key word, however, was "unless."
Even before Booker, a judge was not absolutely required to
sentence a defendant within the range calculated after finding those facts specifically identified in the Guidelines. To
the contrary, the Guidelines calculation did nothing more
than create a range upon which Section 3 553 (b) conferred a
presumption of correctness.2 4 When Booker was decided in
2005, the presumption was a strong one to be sure, made
so by the fairly restrictive mechanism for overcoming it
specified by 3553 (b), in combination with the strong de
novo standard of review imposed on all departures before
United States v. Koon 25 and reimposed on downward departures by the PROTECT Act of 2003.26 Still, a pre-Booker
Guidelines sentencing range was presumptive and not
mandatory, a point conclusively demonstrated by the battle
between the Supreme Court and Congress over the standard of review for departures from the range.
In Koon, the Supreme Court changed the standard of
review for departures from the Guidelines from de novo
review to abuse of discretion. The Court was plainly aware
that in making this change it was loosening controls on
district court adherence to the Guidelines range and thus
weakening the presumption of correctness enjoyed by a
within-range sentence. Congress, for its part, understood
the same point and, dismayed by statistical evidence suggesting that Koon's relaxed standard of review was
contributing to a growing percentage of departures,27
passed the PROTECT Act, which reinvigorated the presumption favoring a within-range sentence by legislatively
reversing Koon and reinstalling de novo review. This interbranch back-and-forth is critical to understanding the real
issues in Rita and Claiborne,not only because it graphically demonstrates the presumptive character of
pre-Booker Guidelines ranges but also because it reinforces the point made above regarding the centrality of
appellate review to Sixth Amendment analysis. In a word,
the strength of a presumption favoring a within-range sentence is dependent on the nature and rigor of the standard
of appellate review.
How, then, does the Eighth Circuit treat Claiborne's
sentencing range after Booker? First, it held that because
the Guidelines were fashioned after years of study and
took the factors listed in 3553(a) into account, the "guidelines sentencing range, though advisory, is presumed
reasonable."2s Second, if a challenge is brought to a sentence imposed outside the range, the court of appeals will
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review the district court's decision to vary from the range
and the extent of such a variance sentence for reasonableness. 29 Third, due to the presumption of reasonableness
afforded the Guideline range, a judge who sentences outside of it must "offer appropriate justification under the
factors specified in 18 U.S.C. 5 3553(a)." 30 Fourth, the justification "must be proportional to the extent of the
difference between the advisory range and the sentence
imposed."3I Finally, and critically, the court said, "A 'range
of reasonableness' is within the court's discretion," but "[ajn
extraordinaryreduction [such as Claibome's sentence 6o
percent below the Guidelines range] must be supported by
32
extraordinarycircumstances."
In short, the court found that the range determined by
application of the Guidelines to judicially determined facts
remains presumptively correct, but the presumption of its
correctness can be easily overcome so long as the judge
stays close to the range. Thus the "range of reasonableness" that is "within the court's discretion" extends
somewhat beyond the bounds of the Guidelines range.
However, the presumption of correctness enjoyed by the
Guidelines range becomes harder to overcome the farther
the judge strays from the range-until at some point the
sentence requires "extraordinary justification." In practical
terms, this means that the diameter of the presumptively
correct sentencing ranges within which a judge may sentence as an exercise of largely unfettered discretion, and
outside of which appellate reversal becomes likely absent
truly unusual facts, has broadened, extending some distance beyond the precise boundaries of the ranges
specified by the Guidelines.
The size of the expanded ranges cannot be precisely
ascertained, but Claiborne gives us a good outer benchmark applicable at least in the Eighth Circuit by holding
that a sentence 6o percent lower than the Guideline range
requires extraordinary justification. Assuming that it
would apply the same margin to sentences imposed above
the range, we can reasonably infer that the strongly presumptive post-Booker sentencing range for a defendant
like Mr. Claiborne is greater than fifteen months and less
than roughly sixty-one months, or approximately sixteen
to sixty months (in contrast to the narrower guideline
range of thirty-seven to forty-six months that would have
been strongly presumptive before Booker). Note that the
location of this post-Booker presumptive range within the
broader interval of statutorily possible sentences is still
determined by the finding of a Guidelines fact-the quantity of crack. If the court had found additional quantities of
drugs, the Guidelines range would increase as would the
accompanying penumbra of presumptively acceptable discretionary variation from the range. For example, if
Claiborne's judge had found twenty grams of crack, the
Guideline range would have been forty-six to fifty-seven
months.33 Applying the Eighth Circuit's 6o percent benchmark would generate a strongly presumptive post-Booker
sentencing range of approximately twenty to eighty-four
months.
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The Eighth Circuit's reading of Booker is not unique in
that the court is to consider in arriving at its judgment
this regard. Any reading of Booker that assigns a presumpabout the proper sentence in a given case. Subsection
tion of correctness to the Guidelines range will have the
3553(a)( 4 )(A) seems to make the Guidelines one factor on
same effect. As the government correctly observes in its
the list by requiring that the court consider the sentencbrief, the existence of a presumptively correct range
ing range established by the Sentencing Commission in
derived from the interaction of findings of fact with the
the Guidelines. Strictly speaking, however, a Guidelines
policy judgments of the Commission embodied in the
range is not a sentencing factor but a judgment by the
Guidelines necessarily implies a principle of proportionalSentencing Commission about the range within which a
ity whereby the strength of the justification for a sentence
sentence should customarily fall given the presence of
outside the range must increase in proportion to the
certain sentencing factors. Although there is disagreedegree the sentence varies from the range.34 The Claiborne ment over whether, in formulating the Guidelines, the
opinion stands out only because the Eighth Circuit makes
Commission took account of all the factors listed in
this point explicit and crystallizes its consequences by
j 3553, there can be no dispute that the Commission conemploying a number (6o percent variance) instead of
sidered most of them. Accordingly, it is hard to make
some vaguer verbal formula to delimit a point at which
sense of the contention that a sentencing judge may give
variance from the Guideline range requires particularly
any single factor listed in 5 3553 the same weight as a
strong justification.
Guideline range, which is the embodiment of an exerThe upshot is that a post-Booker federal sentencing syscise of judgment by the Commission in which the factor
tem based on Guidelines with presumptive force is
singled out by the judge was already considered in comconstitutionally indistinguishable from the pre-Booker
bination with other factors listed in 5 3553(a). For
Guidelines regime, at least if the standard of reference is
example, what does it mean to say that the judge may
the "bright-line rule" endorsed in Cunningham. In both
give "the nature and circumstances of the offense" the
systems, post-conviction judicial findings of fact create a
same weight as a Guideline range, which is, by design,
strongly presumptive sentencing range the top end of
based largely on the nature and circumstances of the
which is higher than the sentence that could be imposed
offense? The petitioners' argument makes sense only
based on the fact of conviction alone. The only change
when understood as a claim that the sentencingcourt's
wrought by Booker is that the range is now wider and its
judgment about how each factor listed in S 3553(a) should
boundaries less precise than formerly. Hence, Claiborne
affect the sentence is entitled to exactly the same weight as
and Rita should win unless the difference between a conthe Sentencing Commission'sjudgment on the same point.
stitutional and an unconstitutional system rests on
And if that is the case, then the Guidelines are purely
strength of the presumption created by fact-finding, rather
hortatory and not even a meaningful benchmark against
than on the employment of fact-finding to create one. 35
which the reasonableness of the district court's sentence
can be measured on review. Indeed, this is precisely the
37
The Petitioners' Position in Rita and Claiborne
petitioners' contention.
On the other hand, the positions adopted by petitioners
As an exercise in statutory construction, this just will
and their amicus supporters in Claiborneand Rita are no
not fly. First, the text of the judicially redacted Sentencing
more tenable than that of the government. UnsurprisReform Act does not support the petitioners' position. The
ingly, petitioners begin with the premise that a system
petitioners focus exclusively on 5 3553(a), as if that single
with presumptive guideline ranges determined by judicial
statutory subsection were the whole statute. At most,
fact-finding is inconsistent with the Apprendi-Blakely§ 3553(a) is one of several SRA provisions now assigned to
Booker line3 6 The problem for petitioners arises because
Title 18 that, read together, lay out the general contours of
the Booker Court did not strike down the Sentencing
a new sentencing regime built around the sentencing
Reform Act in toto but instead left the entire edifice intact,
guidelines the newly created Sentencing Commission was
save two sections, and declared that the remainder constito write. The bulk of the act, now codified in Title 28,
tutes a constitutionally acceptable system. Accordingly,
United States Code, S 995-998, is devoted to creating the
petitioners cannot argue that the Sentencing Reform Act
Commission, defining its powers and responsibilities, and
as judicially amended in Booker is unconstitutional but
setting parameters for the Guidelines that were and are
instead must argue as a matter ofstatutory construction that
the Commission's reason for existence. The centrality of
the act, as redacted, does not confer presumptive effect on
the Guidelines to the Sentencing Reform Act is evident in
Guideline ranges.
a hundred ways and would have been so even if\S 3553 (b)
Indeed, petitioners contend that the excision of Sechad never been enacted. Consider, as but one obvious
tion 3 553 (b) not only eliminates the strongly presumptive
example, S3553(c), which remains in effect after Booker
character of the Guidelines ranges but also makes the
and requires judges to provide a statement of reasons for
Guidelines no more than one factor coequal with the
the sentence imposed and, if the sentence is outside the
other sentencing considerations listed in 3553(a). This
Guideline range, to state "the specific reason for the impocontention is both more complex and more extreme than
sition of a sentence different from" the range. This
it appears. Section 3553(a) is written as a list of factors
requirement alone creates a de facto presumption of the
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correctness of the Guidelines range inasmuch as it
requires a special explanation of the decision to deviate
from that range. Likewise, 28 U.S.C. S 9 9 4 (b)(2), the socalled 25 percent rule, which limits the width of Guideline
ranges, makes sense only if the ranges have legal consequence. Limiting the size of ranges judges are at perfect
liberty to ignore would be pointless.
A great deal of space is expended in various of the
briefs in Claiborneand Rita arguing about congressional
intent) 8 In truth, the effort to determine congressional
intent here is a comically solemn exercise in counterfactual absurdity-an attempt to divine what Congress
would have intended if it had intended to enact a statute
it did not enact. But even if the peculiarities of the Booker
remedy force consideration of what Congress would have
intended had it known in 1984 that Booker would be
decided in 2oo5, that speculation does not help the petitioners. If anything is clear about congressional intent, it
is that the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act was not
to grant judges effectively unlimited sentencing discretion, subject only to the requirement that they explain
their choices using the categories on the list in S3553(a).
The purpose of the act when passed in 5984 was exactly
the reverse-to create a sentencing commission that
would in turn create guidelines for the precise purpose of
constraining the exercise of judicial discretion within
fairly narrow ranges. The only reasonable conclusion
about what Congress would have intended had it known
about Booker is that Congress would have wanted a system as close as possible to the one it actually enacted.
Because Congress enacted a system with strongly presumptive guidelines, and made them even more
presumptive over the ensuing twenty years with legislation like the PROTECT Act, the only rational inference is
that it would want a system in which the Guidelines are
as strongly presumptive as the Court's reading of the constitution will now permit.
Amicus Briefs
Amici in support of petitioners, though often thoughtful
and erudite, are no more convincing on the basic questions of constitutional law and statutory interpretation
than petitioners themselves. For example, a brief authored
primarily by Professors Marc Miller and Ronald Wright
offers, in characteristically lucid style, the proposition that
the key to distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable Guideline ranges is examination of the
procedural rigor of the administrative process employed
by the Sentencing Commission in enacting them.39 While
intriguing, this suggestion finds no warrant in the Sentencing Reform Act or the Administrative Procedures Act,
from which the Commission's deliberations are legally
exempt. Moreover, assuming that at least some Guidelines
were enacted with the necessary procedural rigor, Miller
and Wright do not address the question-central to Rita
and Claiborne-ofhow much weight to give to a Guideline
range that survives their procedural test.
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The separate amicus brief from "Law Professors Who
Study Sentencing Reform" eloquently expounds on "the
critical importance of judicial sentencing discretion and
suggest[s that] the touchstone of federal sentencing
should be district courts exercising reasoned judgment
in response to case-specific factors and broader norms
established by the Constitution and Congress. 40 This
hymn to the reasoned exercise of judicial discretion is, in
essence, a claim that there neither can nor should be any
meaningful legal constraint on a sentencing judge's
power to assign a sentence within the range created by
jury-found facts. No a priori legislative or administrative
limitations should be imposed. The Federal Guidelines
or similar state enactments should not even be a standard against which trial discretion is measured on
appeal. All that should be required of sentencing judges
is that they exercise reasoned judgment. The defect of
this approach is that it either strips the appellate reasonableness review required by Booker of all content or,
alternatively, amounts to a startling declaration that the
Constitution permits the judiciary to make precisely the
kinds of sentencing law legislatures and sentencing
commissions are forbidden by Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham to enact.
Reasonableness review is contentless if, as the professors' brief maintains, it means nothing more than that
"Courts of Appeals [are] to police the exercise of reasoned
judgment at sentencing by declaring suspect any and all
sentencing decisions that fail to address thoughtfully the
congressional directives of 3553(a)." 4' This "thoughtfulness" standard of review requires nothing more than that
the judge explain a sentence in a minimally rational way
using approved categories and buzzwords. But rational,
reasonable people can come to diametrically different conclusions about the same facts. Some quite reasonable
people think that those who sell small quantities of drugs
should receive substantial prison sentences. Other quite
reasonable people think such persons should receive probation or no criminal sanction at all. People with both
views occupy seats on the federal bench. If both conclusions are sustainable on appeal so long as they are
"thoughtfully" expressed, then law is banished from the
sentencing arena.
For reasonableness review to have any content there
must be some point of reference from which a sentencing judge can begin and some standards against which an
appellate court can measure his conclusion. If, as petitioners and the professors' brief contend, those standards
cannot be established by the Guidelines or any similar
legislative or administrative product, then the only possible source of standards is the common-law power of
appellate courts to create rules through the process of
case-by-case adjudication. But if only appellate judges can
create standards of reasonableness, the effect is to declare
that the Constitution permits only judges to constrain the
sentencing discretion of other judges and thus confers on
the judiciary a power it denies to the other branches-a
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conclusion hard to find in the Sixth Amendment or
indeed anywhere else in the Constitution.
A Way Forward?

If the law is a muddle, the position of the government and
the majority of the circuits that afford the Guidelines presumptive weight offends the Blakely/Cunningham
"bright-line rule," and the petitioners' position cannot be
squared with either the surviving components of the Sentencing Reform Act or common sense, what should the
Court do? It is no secret that I have always thought Blakely
a huge mistake42 that the Court should repudiate in favor
of a more constitutionally coherent approach.43 But Cunningham makes clear that, to paraphrase Doug Berman, at
least six justices have now bought tickets to Blakely-land,
so the most the rest of us can do is offer constructive suggestions about how best to order the affairs of that
peculiar region. So, for what they may be worth, here are
my suggestions.
First, the Court should reject the extremist view that no
rule, guideline, or standard that correlates judicial findings of fact to preferred outcomes may constrain the
discretion of a sentencing judge within the range created
by jury findings or defendant admissions. To do otherwise
is to say that law cannot operate within the range created
by jury verdict or plea and that, within it, the Constitution
requires that the power of the individual sentencing judge
be absolute.
Second, the Court should recognize that if the discretion of the sentencing judge within the jury or
plea-generated range may constitutionally be subject to
some legally enforceable constraints, then the BlakelyCunningham"bright-line rule" needs a codicil that defines
the degree to which a standard or guideline based on judicial fact-finding may constrain the sentencing judge's
discretion without offending the Sixth Amendment.
Third, such a rule might be very simple, amounting to
nothing more than a description of the weight that may
constitutionally be accorded on appeal to a rule or standard that correlates a judicially found fact to a preferred
sentencing outcome. If the Court takes this path, it will
have to speak in the language of presumptions because
the law has no other language to speak of such things.
Plainly, the Court will not permit a sentencing rule to create a mandatory, conclusive, or irrebuttable presumption,
because such a "presumption" is really just a rule of positive law. At the other end of the spectrum, the Court might
permit guidelines to create something like a permissive
inference of the correctness of a sentence within them,
meaning that the judge is entitled to conclude that the
Guideline range represents a proper balance of all the relevant factors and that she need offer no explanation beyond
the Guidelines calculation in order to provide a legally sufficient statement of reasons. The effect of such a rule in
the federal system would be to shield a sentence within
the applicable range (such as that imposed on Rita) from
serious appellate scrutiny without raising any necessary
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inference of the incorrectness/unreasonableness of a sentence outside the range. But the permissive inference
approach does not assist in determining the reasonableness of sentences outside the range (such as that imposed
on Claiborne). It says nothing about how to weight factors
identified as reasons for sentencing outside the rangethat is, will any rational justification be considered equal
in weight to the existence of the range? Nor does it solve
the proportionality problem-that is, does a sentence a
long way outside the range require a stronger justification
than one closer to the range?
The middle option is some form of rebuttable presumption of correctness of the range suggested by rule or
guideline. Adoption of this approach would require setfling a number of subsidiary questions. First, a rebuttable
presumption can be either very strong or very weak in its
practical effect depending on what is legally required to
overcome the presumption. The Supreme Court would
have to decide what strength it preferred and signal that
preference through its description of the presumption.
Second, the government is surely right that if the Guideline range is to be afforded some special weight, even as
the necessary starting point for judicial choices, this extra
weight implies a principle of proportionality in judging
the end point of the sentencing process. However, conceding the inevitability of a proportionality principle does not
answer the questions of how far a court may vary from the
presumptively reasonable range before risking reversal or
of what justifications he may properly offer for the variance. Third, a key question in the federal setting will be
whether a judge may explain his choice to impose a sentence outside of the range based on a disagreement with
the policy choices made by the Commission in drafting
the Guidelines and thereafter implicitly ratified by Congress. If that class of explanation is permitted as part of
the justification for a non-Guideline sentence, then the
presumption favoring the Guideline range is very much
weakened.
Fourth, and finally, given the many variations in sentencing systems to which the Court's constitutional
rulings apply, the Court might elect to go beyond the language of presumptions to address other features of
sentencing rules that act to constrain judicial discretion.
These include, but are surely not limited to: (i) whether
the fact of conviction generates only a small number of
determinate, single-point sentences from which the judge
must choose (as was the case under California law in Cunningham) or instead generates ranges within which the
judge may exercise discretion (as was true in Washington
in Blakely and is the case under the Federal Guidelines);
(2) in systems where conviction generates ranges, whether
the ranges are wide or narrow, and whether there are few
or many possible ranges; and (3) whether the universe of
facts the court is to consider in determining whether to
sentence in a range higher than that suggested by conviction alone is small or large. For example, the Court might
distinguish the federal system post-Booker from the Cali-
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fomia system pre-Cunninghamby observing that the federal system creates ranges, not single determinate
sentences; that the federal system allows for movement
between many different ranges, whereas the California
system had only three options; and that the federal Sentencing Reform Act in combination with the Guidelines
and policy statements identify far more facts, factors, and
purposes as relevant to the judge's ultimate choice than
did California. Based on distinctions of this kind, the
Court might conclude that a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness is permissible in context of the overall federal system when it might not be in California.
Conclusion
The snippet from Alice's conversation with Humpty
Dumpty in the tile of this article44 pops up fairly regularly
in legal writings, customarily to give a literary tang to the
unexceptional observation that legal quarrels over the
meaning of words are often arguments about the distribution of power. Still, even if neither the general point about
law nor the choice of literary tag to illustrate it is startlingly original, both are, I think, unusually apt as applied
to the Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. In the line of cases beginning with Apprendi and
running through Cunningham we have found out that
"statutory maximum sentence" does not mean the maximum sentence set by statute, but something altogether
different, and we have been introduced to a bright-line
rule that is anything but. Most importantly, we have
watched the Court decide a series of cases nominally
about the Sixth Amendment fight to a jury trial that have
had virtually no practical effect on how many cases are
decided by juries or even on the issues decided by juries in
those cases that go to trial. Particularly in the federal system, the locus of the Rita and Claibornecases, the effect of
the new Sixth Amendment regime on jury practice has
been nil. The jury trial rate in federal courts is now lower
than it was before Booker.45 And in those cases that go to
trial, juries decide no more facts related to sentencing
than they did before Booker. The entire debate about the
post-Booker federal sentencing world has had nothing to
do with juries, and everything to do with the allocation of
sentencing power between the judiciary (trial and appellate), Congress, and federal prosecutors.
If the Court is wise, it will address the issue of which
is to be master of federal sentencing squarely in Rita and
Claiborneand use these cases to develop Sixth Amendment law in a way that constructively balances the
interests of the constitutional actors. A rule that insists
that the fact of conviction must grant judges absolute
sentencing discretion or none at all does not accomplish
this end. By contrast, a rule that permits legislatures and
their administrative sentencing commission surrogates
to create fact-driven guidelines with a moderately presumptive effect allows the legislature to influence
sentencing through rule making and the executive to
influence sentencing through presentation of evidence
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but gives proper scope to the exercise of judicial intelligence and authority.
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